Case No. 9 GR No. 211969 2021-10-04
LINDEN SUITES v. MERIDIEN FAR EAST PROPERTIES ✍️👨⚖️ HERNANDO, J.
The RTC as the judgment court has supervisory control over the execution of its judgment.
We reiterated the above holding in Javier v. Court of Appeals in this wise:
"The said branch has a general supervisory control over its processes in the execution of its judgment with a right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution."
The court's supervisory control does not, however, extend as to authorize the alteration or amendment of a final and executory decision, save for certain recognized exceptions, among which is the correction of clerical errors. Else, the court violates the principle of finality of judgment and its immutability, concepts.
----
SPONSORED
RECOMMENDED BAR REVIEW BOOKS; REMEDIAL LAW.
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, BOOK I & II estrada
Civil Procedure (The Bar Lecturer Series) VOL. II. (2022 Ed.) by Dean Willard (+)
EVIDENCE (2022 Ed.) by Dean Willard (+)
The Revised Rules of Court Codal (Pocket-Size) 2022 by CBSI Editorial Staff [Hardcover]
UP Law Complex. ANSWER TO BAR EXAMINATION QUESTION IN REMEDIAL LAW 1997-2018
Questions & Answers of 2005-2021 Supreme Court Decisions in Remedial Law (2022 edition)
Product Name: Emilio Llanes (2016) - Legal Maxims with Latin Proverbs, A Compilation of - Law Book
A writ of certiorari under Rule 65 is an extraordinary remedy limited to correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It aims to keep the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to preclude it from committing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The burden lies on the petitioner who must prove that that the lower comi gravely abused its discretion tantamount to lack or excess of iurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is therefore not enough to warrant a certiorari proceeding.
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
In Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio,3 i the Court elucidated:
The term "grave abuse of dis discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a ''capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in cotemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
Furthermore, the use of a petilion for certiorari is restricted only to ''truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x x x.
The RTC as the judgment court has supervisory control over the execution of its judgment.
It is settled that the court which rendered the judgment has supervisory control over the execution of its judgment. It does not, however, give the court the power to alter or amend a final and executory decision in the absence of the recognized exceptions, namely:
(a) if there is a need to correct clerical errors which cause no prejudice to any party;
(b) void judgrnents, and;
(c) if circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable.
This Court expounded on the supervisory control of the judgment court in Kukan International Corporation v. Reyes, to wit:
In Carpio v. Doroja, the Court ruled that the deciding court has supervisory control over the execution of its judgment:
A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution.
We reiterated the above holding in Javier v. Court of Appeals in this wise:
"The said branch has a general supervisory control over its processes in the execution of its judgment with a right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution."
The court's supervisory control does not, however, extend as to authorize the alteration or amendment of a final and executory decision, save for certain recognized exceptions, among which is the correction of clerical errors. Else, the court violates the principle of finality of judgment and its immutability, concepts which the Court, in Tan v. Timbal, defined:
As we held in Industrial Management International Development Corporation vs. NLRC:
It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to settlement of rights of the parties. Once a decision or order becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend it. It thereby becomes immutable and unalterable and any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose. An order of execution which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.
The judgment court's supervisory control over the case ensures the enforcement of a party's rights or claims that it has duly recognized. Indeed, a court's mandate to resolve disputes ends upon its adjudication of the litigation. It is only when the party that has secured favorable judgment finally relishes the fruits of its legal calvary that justice may be said to have been duly served. This tenet fortifies a judgment court's so-called supervisory control over decided suits.
Corollarily, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court lays down available remedies and guidelines for the satisfaction of a judgment, including enforcement of a writ of execution, which the winning party may avail of before the judgment court. Among the remedies available to such party to fully enforce the writ of execution is the examination of a judgment obligor.
Doctrine: A judgment obligee is entitled, as a matter of right, to an order of the court which rendered judgment if the writ of execution issued against the judgment obligor was returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part.
Section 5 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides that every court has the inherent power to "amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice". The court, in carrying out its jurisdiction, can thus issue "auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect" and to adopt any suitable process or mode of proceeding "which appears conformable to the spirit of the said law or rules".
In Mejia v. Gabayan, the Court held:
The general rule is that it is the ministerial duty of the court to order the execution of its final judgment. However, Rule 135, Section 5(g) of the Rules of Court provides that the trial court may amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice. It has the inherent power to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial offices, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto. The inherent power of the court carries with it the right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution. The court may stay or suspend the execution of its judgment if warranted by the higher interest of justice. It has the authority to cause a modification of the decision when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. The court is also vested with inherent power to stay the enforcement of its decision based on antecedent facts which show fraud in its rendition or want of jurisdiction of the trial court apparent on the record.
Doctrine: The doctrine of separate juridical personality is inapplicable in the case at bench.
To recall, one of the grounds for the denial by the RTC of petitioner's motion for examination is that the examination of respondent's officers would constitute a violation of the doctrine of separate juridical personality. The trial court held that the doctrine applies even if the officers would be examined for the sole purpose of ascertaining respondent's properties and income.
The Court finds the trial court's pronouncement misplaced.
The doctrine of separate juridical personality provides that a corporation has a legal personality separate and distinct from those individuals acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from those comprising it. Any obligation incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, is therefore its sole liability. This legal fiction may only be disregarded if it is used as a means to perpetrate fraud or an illegal act, or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues.45
The well-settled doctrine is inapplicable in the case at bench. Petitioner wanted the officers to be examined not for the purpose of passing unto them the liability of respondent as its judgment obligor. In fact, it never averred in the motion any intention to make the officers liable for respondent's obligation due to the latter's purported attempts to evade the execution of the final judgment. What is clear therein is that the sole objective of the examination of the officers was to ascertain the properties and income of respondent which can be subjected for execution in order to satisfy the final judgment and nothing else.
In sum, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error in finding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to examine respondent's officers.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 18, 2013 Decision and the March 31, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 121311 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 70 of Pasig City, is DIRECTED to examine respondent's officers in accordance with this Court's Decision.
Download full text here
Cases penned by Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando PART 1 case no. 1 to 40 [FULL TEXT] .pdf
You must be logged in to post a comment.